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THE DUTY TO DEFEND-Brown v. Lumbermens
Mutual Casualty Company
INTRODUCTION
There are thousands of words defined in Webster's Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary. Few of these words have a more clear or
definite definition than the word "exhaust."' Yet, the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court found ambiguity in the word "exhaust" and
used this ambiguity to expand the duty to defend under an insur-
ance policy. In doing so, the court trampled upon established rules
of insurance law' and continued North Carolina's deviation from
the principle that insurance policies should be strictly construed.3
This Note has five purposes. First, this Note reviews the facts
of Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co.4 Second, this Note
examines the judicial logic of the Brown decision. Third, this Note
addresses public policy concerns left unanswered by the courts.
Fourth, this Note examines Brown's impact on N.C. Gen. Stat. §
20-279.21(b)(4). Finally, this Note concludes that while Brown
should be applauded for extending the duty to defend, the court
unnecessarily stretched basic principles of contract law to justify
its decision.
THE CASE
Brown was involved in an automobile accident with Hinson in
1983.1 Hinson sued Brown in 1984 for injuries sustained in the ac-
cident.6 Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company thereinafter
LMCC], Brown's automobile insurance carrier, employed outside
1. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 434 (9th ed. 1987)(defining
"exhaust" to mean to consume entirely; to use up).
2. Policies of liability insurance, like all other written contracts, are to be
construed and enforced according to their terms. If plain and unambiguous, the
meaning thus expressed must be ascribed to. Lane v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.,
48 N.C. App. 634, 637, 269 S.E.2d 711, 714 (1980), review denied, 302 N.C. 219,
276 S.E.2d 916 (1981).
3. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 303 N.C. 387, 390, 279
S.E.2d 769, 771 (1981)(discussing North Carolina's deviation from strict construc-
tion principles).
4. 326 N.C. 387, 390 S.E.2d 150 (1990).
5. Id. at 389, 390 S.E.2d at 151.
6. Id.
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counsel to defend Brown. Counsel for Brown informed LMCC
that Brown would probably be found liable and predicted a jury
verdict of between $50,000 and $75,000.8 LMCC filed an offer of
judgment to pay $25,000, the policy limits under Brown's insur-
ance policy.' Hinson rejected LMCC's offer and demanded $43,000
to settle the claim.'0 LMCC then offered the policy limits to Hin-
son in partial satisfaction of her claim. 1 Brown objected and re-
fused to contribute to settling the claim.12 LMCC subsequently
paid the policy limits to Hinson, and Hinson released LMCC from
future claims.'" Counsel retained by LMCC'was allowed to with-
draw from representing Brown." LMCC subsequently discharged
its counsel. 5 Brown did not employ new counsel.' 6 Hinson ob-
tained a $45,000 verdict againstan unrepresented Brown on May
1, 1985."7
Brown filed a separate action against LMCC alleging that
LMCC breached its insurance contract by failing to defend
Brown.' 8 The trial court granted LMCC's motion for summary
judgment, ruling that the duty to defend terminated upon pay-
ment of the policy limits.' 9 The court of appeals reversed and re-
manded, concluding that the duty to defend provision in LMCC's
policy was ambiguous.2" The court of appeals determined that
7. Id.
8. Id. at 389, 390 S.E.2d at 151.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 390, 390 S.E.2d at 151-52.
12. Id. at 390, 390 S.E.2d at 151.
13. Id. LMCC paid Hinson pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-540.3 (1983 &
Supp. 1988) and an Advance Payment Agreement. Id.
14. Id. at 390, 390 S.E.2d at 152.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 391, 390 S.E.2d at 151. Brown also alleged that General Motors
negligently failed to investigate the design, construction and assembly of the
brake system on.Brown's 1979 Cadillac. Apparently, this allegation forms part of
the basis of Brown's claim against General Motors. Id. at 391, 390 S.E.2d at 152.
17. Id. at 390, 390 S.E.2d at 152. "The trial court entered judgment on the
verdict but credited the judgment with the $25,000 LMCC paid Hinson," leaving
Brown personally liable for $20,000. Brown obtained counsel and appealed. The
court of appeals found no error. See Hinson v. Brown, 80 N.C. App. 661, 343
S.E,2d 284, review denied, 318 N.C. 282, 348 S.E.2d 138 (1986).
18. Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 326 N.C. 387, 391, 390 S.E.2d
150, 152 (1990).
19. Id.
20. Id.
[Vol. 13:141
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LMCC had not specified the manner in which the coverage limits
would have to be exhausted before its duty to defend was dis-
charged.2 The supreme court affirmed.22 The supreme court held
that a unilateral tender2 3 of the policy limits without effecting a
settlement of the claims against the insured does not relieve an
insurance carrier of its duty to defend.24
BACKGROUND
A. The McCarthy Decision
Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. McCarthy,25 the leading
case limiting an insurance company's duty to defend after payment
of its policy limits, was decided over fifty years ago. The court in
McCarthy set forth two diverse propositions regarding the duty to
defend after payment of the policy limits. 2
6
McCarthy held that an insurance company had no duty to de-
fend after paying its policy limits. 27 McCarthy also, in dicta, for-
mulated the standard for another principle which is now accepted
in some jurisdictions.2" The insurer cannot avoid its obligation to
defend against an insured's contingent liability by making an early
payment of the policy limits without effectuating a settlement or
21. Id.
'22. Id.
23. A unilateral tender occurs when the insurance company pays the limits of
liability under the insurance policy without consent of the insured. See Brown v.
Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 326 N.C. 387, 391, 390 S.E.2d 150, 152 (1990).
24. Id. at 397, 390 S.E.2d at 155-56.
25. 90 N.H. 320, 8 A.2d 750 (1939). McCarthy resulted from an automobile
collision involving Mr. McCarthy and his son. Individual suits were filed against
both Mr. McCarthy and his son. The actions were tried together and resulted in
verdicts against both. The insurance company paid the policy limits to satisfy the
judgment against the son. The insurance company subsequently notified Mr. Mc-
Carthy that by paying the limits of the policy, it had discharged its obligation
under the policy. The insurance company advised Mr. McCarthy to obtain other
counsel as its duty to defend terminated upon payment of the policy limits.
LMCC filed a petition to determine (1) whether it was under any obligation to
further defend and (2) whether it was obligated to pay the judgment. McCarthy,
90 N.H. at -, 8 A.2d at 751. See also Zulkey & Pollard, The Duty to Defend
After Exhaustion of Policy Limits, FOR THE DEFENSE, June 1985, at 21, 23-24
[hereinafter Zulkey & Pollard].
26. Zulkey and Pollard, supra note 25, at 23 (citing McCarthy, 90 N.H. at
323, 8 A.2d at 752).
27. McCarthy, 90 N.H. at -, 8 A.2d at 752.
28. Zulkey & Pollard, supra note 25, at 23.
1990]
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without obtaining the insured's permission.29
The dichotomous language in McCarthy sparked the current
split of judicial opinion regarding the duty to defend after pay-
ment of policy limits. Nationally, there are two diverse views.3 "
"One view is that the insurer is excused from paying the insured's
defense costs once the total amount of the coverage has been
paid. ' 31 The opposite view is that payment of the policy limits
does not terminate the insurer's duty to defend.
32
B. 1966 Comprehensive General Liability Policy Language
Change
Prior to 1966, the standard comprehensive general liability
policy [hereinafter CGL] did not contain a provision requiring an
insurance company to defend its insured after the policy limits
29. Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 326 N.C. 387, 395, 390 S.E.2d 150,
155 (1990) (citing Anderson v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 177 Ga. App.
520, 521, 339 S.E.2d 660, 661 (1986)). See also Anchor Casualty Co. v. McCaleb,
178 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1949)(applying Texas law); Simmons v. Jeffords, 260 F.
Supp. 641 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mead Corp., 219 Ga. 6, 131
S.E.2d 534 (1963); Sutton Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rolph, 109 N.H. 142, 244 A.2d 186
(1968).
30. Zulkey & Pollard, supra note 25, at 21.
31. Id. at 22 (citing Denham v. LaSalle-Madison Hotel Co., 168 F.2d 576 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 871 (1948); General Casualty Co. v. Whipple, 328 F.2d
353 (7th Cir. 1964); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Montgomery Trucking Co., 328 F. Supp.
415 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds
of London, 56 Cal. App. 3d 791, 129 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1976); National Union Ins. Co.
v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 301 A.2d 222 (D.C. App. 1973); Hartford Accident &
Indem. Co. v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 252 S.C. 428, 166 S.E.2d 762 (1969); Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mead Corp., 219 Ga. 6, 131 S.E.2d 534 (1963); Oda v. High-
way Ins. Co., 44 Ill. App. 2d 235, 194 N.E.2d 489 (1963); Traveler's Indem. Co. v.
New England Box Co., 102 N.H. 380, 157 A.2d 765 (1960); Lumbermens Mut.
Casualty Co. v. McCarthy, 90 N.H. 320, 8 A.2d 750 (1939)).
32. Zulkey & Pollard, supra note 25, at 21 (citing Anchor Casualty Co. v.
McCaleb, 178 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1949); ACandS, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur.
Co., 576 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Pittsburgh
Corning Corp., 553 F. Supp. 425 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Simmons v. Jeffords, 260 F.
Supp. 641 (E.D. Pa. 1966); National Casualty Co. v. Insurance Co., 320 F. Supp.
617 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Travelers Indem. Co. v. East, 240 So. 2d 277 (Miss. 1970);
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 150 Mont. 182, 433 P.2d 795 (1967);
Prince v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 143 N.W.2d 708 (N.D. 1966); American
Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, Inc., 205 Misc. 1066, 131
N.Y.S.2d 393 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954), appeal withdrawn, 1 A.D.2d 1008, 154
N.Y.S.2d 835 (1956).
[Vol. 13:141
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were exhausted. 3 The insurance industry changed the wording of
the standard CGL policy in 1966. 34 Following this change, the stan-
dard CGL policies have included a provision to the effect that an
insurer does not have to defend a suit after the limits of liability
have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements. a5
C. Recently'Interpreted Cases Extending the Duty to Defend
More recently, standard CGL policies have contained the lan-
guage used by LMCC in Brown. The language states:
We will pay for bodily injury or property damage for which any
covered person becomes legally responsible because of an automo-
bile accident. We will settle or defend, as we consider appropri-
ate, any claim or suit asking for these damages. In addition to our
limit of liability, we will pay all defense costs we incur. Our duty
to settle or defend ends when our limit of liability for this cover-
age has been exhausted.
36
There have been few cases interpreting this specific language.37
But, cases have held that an insurer cannot make a unilateral
tender of its policy limits without effecting a settlement or ob-
taining a judgment.
Stanley v. Cobb3" involved a personal injury action arising
from an automobile accident.3 ' The insured had $15,000 liability
limits in the insurance policy issued by American International
Group [hereinafter the primary carrier]. 40 The injured plaintiff's
automobile policy included underinsured motorist coverage under-
33. Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 326 N.C. 387, 395, 390 S.E.2d
150, 154 (1990). See also Zulkey & Pollard, supra note 25, at 22.
34. Brown, 326 N.C. at 395, 390 S.E.2d at 154. See also Van Vugt, Termina-
tion of the Insurer's Duty to Defend by Exhaustion of Policy Limits, 44 INS.
COUNSEL J. 254, 257 (1977)[hereinafter Van Vugt].
35. Brown, 326 N.C. at 395, 390 S.E.2d at 154 (citing Van Vugt, supra note
34, at 257 n.5). The post-1966 policy language did not appear in the majority of
the cases cited supra notes 31-32. Van Vugt, supra note 34, at 257 n.5.
36. Brown, 326 N.C. at 389, 390 S.E.2d at 153.
37. Id. at 395, 390 S.E.2d at 154 (citing Stanley v. Cobb, 624 F. Supp. 536
(E.D. Tenn. 1986); Samply v. Integrity Ins. Co., 476 So. 2d 79 (Ala. 1985); Ander-
son v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 177 Ga. App. 520, 339 S.E.2d 660
(1986); Pareti v. Sentry Indem. Co., 536 So. 2d 417 (La. 1988)).
38. 624 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 537.
1990]
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written by Nationwide Insurance Company. 41
Counsel for the insured moved for permission to withdraw
from further defense of the case upon payment by the primary car-
rier of the $15,000 liability limits. 4s The underinsured motorist car-
rier opposed the primary carrier's motion to withdraw.43 The dis-
trict court denied the primary carrier's motion to withdraw. 4 The
court stated that the limit of liability could not be exhausted in a
manner other than that specified by the policy.45 "There were no
provisions in the primary carrier's policy which gave the insurer
the right to avoid the obligation of defense by paying into court
any definite sum of money.''46 The court held that absent a clause
specifically granting such a right, the insurance contract had to be
interpreted by its plain meaning.47
In Samply v. Integrity Ins. Co.,48 Samply, the negligent in-
sured, collided with a car driven by Hatter.49 Samply's insurance
policy with the Integrity Insurance Company [hereinafter Integ-
rity] contained a $10,000 limit of liability.50 Integrity filed a declar-
atory judgment action naming Samply and the Hatters as defend-
ants.51 Integrity sought to have the limits of its liability established
at $10,000 and to be discharged from the suit upon payment of the
policy limits into the court.52 The trial court ruled in favor of In-
tegrity and discharged it from any further defense of Samply.53
The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed and remanded. 4 The
Samply court held "that the better rule of law is that an insurer
. . . cannot avoid its duty to defend against an insured's contin-
gent liability by tendering the amount of its policy limits into
court without effectuating a settlement or obtaining the consent of
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 536.
45. Id. at 537.
46. Id. at 538.
47. Id.
48. 476 So. 2d 79 (Ala. 1985).
49. Id. at 80.
50. Id. The Samplys' policy provided coverage limited to $10,000 per injured
person and $20,000 per accident. Id.
51. Id. The declaratory judgment action also named the Hatters' daughter.
Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 81.
54. Id. at 84.
[Vol. 13:141
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the insured." 55
In Anderson v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co.,56 the appellant
Anderson defended several suits filed by parties allegedly injured
in a multiple-vehicle collision in which Anderson was involved. 7
U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Company [hereinafter U.S. Fidelity]
paid the balance of the policy coverage to the court and was dis-
charged from defending Anderson." Reversing the trial court's de-
cision, the Georgia Court of Appeals stated, "we do not agree . ..
that the term exhaust encompasses the paying into court of the
policy limits, but interpret that term to mean the payment either
of a settlement or of a judgment wholly depleting the policy
amount."59
The rulings in Stanley, Samply and Anderson interpreted
contract language identical to the policy language involved in
Brown.60 The decisions clearly demonstrate the national movement
of extending the duty to defend after the policy limits have been
tendered.
ANALYSIS
A. The Brown Holding
Brown held that an insurer's duty to defend continues until
the coverage limits of the insured's policy have been exhausted in
the settlement of a claim or until a judgment against the insured is
reached."' According to Brown, an insurance- company's unilateral
tender of the policy limits without effecting a settlement will not
relieve an insurance company of its duty to defend the claim
against the insured.2
55. Id. at 83-84.
56. 177 Ga. App. 520, 339 S.E.2d 660 (1986).
57, Id. at -, 339 S.E.2d at 660. Three of the claims were settled by Ander-
son. Other claims were filed in different courts. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at -, 339 S.E.2d at 661.
60. See Stanley v. Cobb, 624 F. Supp. 536, 537 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Samply v.
Integrity Ins. Co., 476 So. 2d 79, 80 (Ala. 1985); Anderson v. United States Fidel-
ity & Guar. Co., 177 Ga. App. 520, -, 339 S.E.2d 660, 660 (1986).
61. Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 326 N.C. 387, 394, 390 S.E.2d
150, 154 (1990).
62. Id. at 397, 390 S.E.2d at 155-56.
1990]
7
Pender: The Duty to Defend - Brown v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1990
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
B. Brown's Rationale
Brown was a case of first impression for the appellate courts of
North Carolina.6 3 The court started its analysis by citing various
cases referencing general insurance law principles.14 The most im-
portant principles being that "[alny ambiguity in the policy lan-
guage must be resolved against the insurance company and in
favor of the insured. 65
The court affirmed the principle that there is not a statutory
duty to defend under a standard insurance policy 66 and that an
insurer's duty to defend "is broader than its obligation to pay
damages under a particular policy."'6 7 The supreme court recog-
nized the principle that LMCC could presumably contractually
limit its duty to defend because the duties to defend and indem-
nify arise by contract.6 8
C. Ambiguity in the Policy
The court then discussed ambiguity in the policy language.6
The court determined that the pertinent policy language was am-
biguous and must be construed in favor of the insured.70 According
to the court, LMCC failed to define the word "exhaust" in the pol-
icy definitions or in the insuring agreement. ' The court deter-
mined that an insurer could exhaust its coverage limits in a num-
ber of ways and gave examples of how insurance policy limits could
be exhausted." Also, the court stated that "other methods of ex-
63. Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 90 N.C. App. 464, 475-77, 369
S.E.2d 367, 372-75 (1988), aff'd, 326 N.C. 387, 390 S.E.2d 150 (1990).
64. Brown, 326 N.C. at 391-93, 390 S.E.2d at 152-53.
65. Id. at 392, 390 S.E.2d at 153 (quoting Woods v. Insurance Co., 295 N.C.
500, 505, 246 S.E.2d 773, 777 (1978)).
66. Id. at 391, 390 S.E.2d at 152; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21 (1983 &
Supp. 1988)(stating requirements of a motor vehicle liability policy).
67. Brown, 326 N.C. at 392, 390 S.E.2d at 153 (quoting Waste Management
of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 688, 691, 340 S.E.2d 374, 377, reh'g
denied, 316 N.C. 386, 346 S.E.2d 134 (1986)(stating also that "the extent of the
duty to defend requires resolution of scope of the policy provisions")).
68. Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 90 N.C. App. 464, 475, 369
S.E.2d 367, 373 (1988), aff'd, 326 N.C. 387, 390 S.E.2d 150 (1990).
69. Brown, 326 N.C. at 393-94, 390 S.E.2d at 153-54.
70. Id. at 393, 390 S.E.2d at 153.
71. Id. at 393-94, 390 S.E.2d at 153-54.
72. Id. at 394, 390 S.E.2d at 154 (stating that the insurance company could
pay the policy limits (1) "into the court and interplead conflicting claimants in a
declaratory judgment action;" (2) "to one of several claimants in return for a com-
148 [Vol. 13:141
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hausting coverage limits were possible."7
The court focused on the manner in which coverage must be
exhausted before the duty to defend terminates." The court relied
on cases from other jurisdictions which have interpreted insurance
language identical to the policy language in Brown."5
1. Pareti v. Sentry Indern. Co.
The court relied heavily on Pareti v. Sentry Indein. Co.76 in
justifying its holding. The Paretis brought suit against an automo-
bile insurer, Pennsylvania General Insurance Company [hereinaf-
ter Penn. General], Penn. General's insured, the Schnellers, and
their own underinsured motorist carrier, Sentry Indemnity Com-
pany [hereinafter Sentry].7 7 "Sentry filed a cross-claim against the
Schnellers, Seeking indemnity for all amounts that Sentry might be
required to pay [the Paretis] under their underinsured motorist
policy. . . . ,,7 Shortly thereafter, the Paretis executed a compro-
mise and release agreement with the Schnellers and Penn. Gen-
eral. 79 The agreement released the Schnellers and Penn. General
from all further liability in exchange for the Schnellers' $50,000
limits of liability."' The Paretis reserved their rights against their
own underinsured motorist carrier, Sentry, in the compromise
agreement. 1 Sentry made no payments to the Paretis under their
underinsured motorist coverage at the time of the settlement with
the Schnellers and Penn. General.82 The settlement exhausted the
plete settlement of that claim against its insured;" (3) "in full or partial satisfac-
tion of a judgment against its insured;" (4) "as an advance sum to its insured in
lieu of investigating whatever defenses might be available;" or (5) "to the injured
party, in return for a release of only the insurer and not the insured"). Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. The ambiguity was not in the meaning of the word "exhaust," but was
in the manner by which the coverage must be exhausted before the duty to de-
fend terminated. Id.
75. The Brown majority used Stanley, Samply, and Anderson to support its
decision. For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 38, 48, 56 and accompa-
nying text.
76. 536 So. 2d 417 (La. 1988).
77. Pareti v. Sentry Indem. Co., 536 So. 2d 417, 419 (La. 1988).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. $50,000 was the limit of Pennsylvania's "per person" liability for the acci-
dent. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
1990]
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Schneller's insurance policy liability limits. 3 Sentry filed a third-
party action against the Schnellers seeking indemnification or con-
tribution.84 The Schnellers' automobile insurer, Penn. General, de-
clined to defend them because the limits of liability had been ex-
hausted in the settlement of Pareti's claims. 5 The Schnellers filed
a cross-claim against Penn. General seeking reimbursement of at-
torney's fees incurred as a result of Penn. General's refusal to
defend. 6
The Pareti court held that under the facts presented, the in-
surer had no duty to defend the other claims.87 Interestingly, the
policy language in Pareti was identical to that involved in Brown,
yet the Supreme Court of Louisiana found it to be unambiguous."
However, the Pareti court stated in a footnote89 that the same pol-
icy language could be found ambiguous if the case involved a situa-
tion where an insurer attempted to tender its policy limits without
obtaining a settlement or judgment." "When an insurer merely
tenders its limits without obtaining a settlement of any claim for
its insured, a strong argument can be made that it has neither ex-
hausted its policy limits nor fulfilled its fiduciary duty to discharge
its policy obligations to the insured in good faith."9
It is interesting to note that the Pareti decision, upon which
the Brown majority relied so heavily, contained a statement of an
elementary principle of insurance law that the Brown majority
failed to mention.92 "[C]ourts have no authority to alter the terms
of policies under the guise of contractual interpretation when the
policy provisions are couched in unambiguous language. '9 3 Thus, it
was crucial for the Brown majority to find ambiguity in the fact
that LMCC did not include the various methods by which the pol-
83. Id.
84. Id. at 417.
85. Id. at 417, 419.
86. Id. at 420.
87. Id. at 424.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 421 n.3.
90. Id,
91. Id. at 422-23. See also Samply v. Integrity Ins. Co., 476 So. 2d 79 (Ala.
1985). Unilateral tenders by the insurer have generally been viewed as insufficient
to terminate the duty to defend. Id. at 421 n.3.
92. Id. at 420-21.
93. Id. at 420. (citing Monteleone v. American Employer's Ins. Co., 239 La.
773, 120 So. 2d 70 (1960); Edwards v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 210 La. 1024, 29
So. 2d 50 (1946)).
[Vol. 13:141
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icy limits could be exhausted. When one reads Pareti, understand-
ing that the Louisiana Supreme Court stated that the pertinent
policy language was unambiguous in certain situations,94 the
Brown majority's staunch reliance on Pareti is severely weakened.
D. Dissent
Justice Whichard's dissenting opinion correctly identified that
"neither the word 'exhausted' nor the manner of 'exhausting' the
policy limits [was] ambiguous. . .. "' "The only reasonable inter-
pretation [of the term 'exhaust'] is that by paying its full policy
limits to the party injured by its insured, defendant [insurance
company] 'exhausted' its limits of liability and ended its duty to
settle or defend."96
Justice Whichard correctly stated that the majority perceived
a double meaning in the policy language in Brown. 7 The major-
ity's interpretation "in effect reinserts policy language into the
contract that was standard in post-1966 insurance contracts" but
which was omitted from the Brown policy. 8
Justice Whichard rightfully accused the majority of reading
more into the contract than was present.9 Justice Whichard cor-
rectly pointed out that "the contract neither states nor implies a
provision limiting 'exhaustion' of policy liability limits to settle-
ment or judgment, or even to a tender for settlement.' ' 00 The lan-
guage specifying the means of exhaustion was patently absent.''
The Supreme Court of North Carolina acknowledged the fact
that "an insurer's duty to defend . . . is determined by the lan-
guage in the insurance contract."'0 2 By affirming the North Caro-
94. Id. at 420-21.
95. Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 326 N.C. 387, 398, 390 S.E.2d
150, 156 (1990)(Whichard, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 398, 390 S.E.2d at 156.
97. Id. The double meaning is that (1) "the duty to defend or settle ends
only after judgment or settlement" or (2) "it ends when the policy limits are ex-
hausted in any other manner." Id.
98. Id. The post-1966 language provides that "[tihe company shall not be
obligated to pay any claim or judgment or to defend any suit or prosecute or
maintain any appeal after the applicable limits of the Company's liability has
been exhausted by payment or any judgments or settlements." Id.
99. Id. at 399, 390 S.E.2d at 157.
100. Id. (citing Gross v. Lloyds of London Ins. Co., 121 Wis. 2d 78, 83, 358
N.W.2d 266, 269 (1984)).
101. Id. at 399, 390 S.E.2d at 157.
102. Id. at 392, 390 S.E.2d at 153 (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mead Corp.,
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lina Court of Appeals decision, °3 the court also acknowledged the
general insurance principle that the duties to' defend and indem-
nify in an insurance policy arise by contract. °4 Therefore, LMCC
could contractually limit its duty to defend.'05
LMCC clearly drafted its policy language so that its duty to
defend ended upon payment of its policy limits. To override this
basic contractual right, the appellate courts of North Carolina
found a clearly defined seven letter word to be ambigious106 In do-
ing so, the supreme court trampled upon yet another general insur-
ance principle of policy construction, one which the supreme court
also recognized in its opinion.0 7 "In construing an insurance pol-
icy, nontechnical words, not defined in the policy, are to be given
the same meaning they usually receive in ordinary speech, unless
the context requires otherwise."'0 8 The word "exhaust" is clearly a
nontechnical word which LMCC did not define in its policy. Nev-
ertheless, the court found ambiguity. 0 9
The North Carolina Supreme Court did not have to find ambi-
guity in the word "exhaust" in order to rule that the duty to de-
fend extends beyond exhaustion of the insured's policy limits. Two
cases cited by the Brown majority addressed identical contract lan-
guage as involved in Brown. These cases reached their decisions
either by not addressing ambiguity or holding the pertinent con-
tract language was unambiguous. 10 The court's lengthy discussion
219 Ga. 6, 8, 131 S.E.2d 534, 535 (1963)).
103. Id. at 397, 390 S.E.2d at 156.
104. Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 90 N.C. App. 464, 475, 369
S.E.2d 367, 373 (1988), aff'd, 326 N.C. 387, 390 S.E.2d 150 (1990).
105. Id.
106. See infra note 1 and accompanying text; see also AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY 475 (2d ed. 1982)(explaining that exhaust is a broad term meaning to
use up, consume or deplete).
1 107. See Brown v. Lumbermehs Mut. Casualty Co., 326 N.C. 387, 392, 390
S.E.2d 150, 153 (1990).
108. Id. (quoting Grant v. Insurance Co., 295 N.C. 39, 42, 243 S.E.2d 894, 897
(1978); see also Davis v. Maryland Casualty Co., 76 N.C. App. 102, 104, 331
S.E.2d 744, 746 (1985).
109. Brown, 326 N.C. at 393, 390 S.E.2d at 153.
110. The Anderson court reached its results after concluding that the provi-
sion was not ambiguous, but that it clearly requires exhaustion of limits in the
payment of a settlement or judgment before the duty to defend terminates. An-
derson v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 177 Ga, App. 520, 521, 339 S.E.2d
660, 661 (1986). Samply failed to mention ambiguity, but nevertheless construed
the provision in favor of the insured. Samply v. Integrity Ins. Co., 476 So. 2d 79,
83 (Ala. 1985).
[Vol. 13:141
12
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1990], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol13/iss1/6
DUTY To DEFEND
of ambiguity in the word exhaust was unnecessary. The North Car-
olina Supreme Court could have easily reached its decision by
completely avoiding the ambiguity issue and citing Anderson and
Samply as authority."'
E. Public Policy Concerns
The Brown decision avoided three public policy concerns that
could adversely affect the citizens of North Carolina. These public
policy concerns are (1) discouragement of advance payments pur-
suant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-540.3; (2) potential escalation of in-
surance costs; and (3) the indirect effect of encouraging drivers to
purchase minimum limits of liability.
1. Discouragement of Advance Payments
The Brown dissent stressed public policy concerns arising
from extending the duty to defend in light of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
540.3(a)." 2 The statute provides for advance payments by an in-
surance company to an injured person without constituting an ad-
mission of liability nor acting as a bar, release, accord and satisfac-
tion, or discharge of obligation." 3 One of the policy reasons behind
enactment of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-5403(a) was to encourage advance
partial payments by insurance companies prior to settlement of a
claim." 4 The statute allows seriously injured persons requiring
long-term medical care to accept partial payments from an insurer
before determination of liability." 5 These payments constitute
neither admissions of liability nor full satisfaction of an injured
party's claim on the part of the insurer.'
The Brown decision will discourage "advance payments since
the carrier will be responsible for the defense costs even if an ad-
vance payment is made." 7 This liability for defense costs will en-
111. See Anderson, 177 Ga. App. at 521, 339 S.E.2d at 661; Samply, 476 So.
2d at 83.
112. Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 326 N.C. 387, 402-03, 390
S.E.2d 150, 158-59 (1990)(Whichard, J., dissenting).
113. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-540.3(a) (1983 & Supp. 1988).
114. Brown, 326 N.C. at 402, 390 S.E.2d at 159 (citing Thornburg v. Lancas-
ter, 303 N.C. 89, 94, 277 S.E.2d 423, 427 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Dan-
iels v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co., 320 N.C. 669, 360 S.E.2d 772 (1987)).
115. Brown, 326 N.C. at 402, 390 S.E.2d at 159.
116. Id.
117. Petition for Discretionary Review at 6, Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas-
ualty Co., 326 N.C. 387, 390 S.E.2d 150 (1990)(No. 337P88A).
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courage the carrier not to make payments prior to trial in the hope
that the jury will return a verdict in an amount less than the car-
rier's liability limits.""' 8 The carrier will be justified in taking this
risk since Brown has eliminated one of the principle benefits of an
advance payment, avoiding defense costs. 1 9
2. Potential Escalation of Insurance Costs
The Brown court did not address a second public policy con-
cern which was clearly raised in LMCC's petition for discretionary
review.1 0 Extending an insurance company's duty to defend after
the policy limits have been exhausted will dramatically escalate
the costs of insurance. 2 ' Insurance carriers have set insurance pre-
miums "based on understanding that the carrier's duty to defend
is satisfied upon the payment of its policy limits." 2 ' The decision
will cause insurance premiums to escalate "since insurers will now
be required . . . [to defend] for multi-million dollar injury even
though liability is clear and the carrier's maximum exposure is
$25,000. "123
3. Encouraging Financial Irresponsibility
A third public policy concern not addressed by the court is
that the Brown decision indirectly subsidizes financial irresponsi-
bility. Brown will encourage many drivers to shirk their potential
liability responsibilities by purchasing the minimum limits of lia-
bility provided by statute. 12  The court's decision drastically
broadens the duties of an insurance company's duty to defend. As
such, the decision broadens the coverage. The public understands
that a significant benefit of liability insurance is not only to pay for
damages as a result of negligent acts; but, more importantly that
the costs of legal defense are generally paid in addition to the lim-
its of liability.1 25
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (1983 & Supp. 1988)(providing
the minimum policy limits required for automobile insurance).
125. A standard feature in all automobile insurance policies is that in addi-
tion to the specified limits of liability, the insurer will pay for defense costs. See
United Services Automobile Association (USAA) Auto Policy form
[Vol. 13:141
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Three of the four cases cited by the Brown majority in support
of its decision involved insureds who elected to purchase minimum
or inadequate limits of liability. 12 6 In these cases, the duty to de-
fend would not have been litigated had the insured accepted the
potential liability exposure and acted in a financially responsible
manner by obtaining liability coverage in excess of the minimum
limits.
The Brown decision does nothing to encourage individuals to
purchase more than the minimum limits of liability. Rather, the
court's opinion increases the benefits of the insurance contract by
requiring an insurance company to provide a defense even after it
has paid the applicable policy limits. Therefore, Brown provides
additional justification for individuals to purchase inadequate lim-
its of liability protection.
F. Effect of Brown on the Underinsured Motorist Statute
The Brown court also failed to address the impact, if any, its
holding may have on the provisions of the underinsured motorist
statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21(b)(4).127 Although the underin-
sured motorist statute was not an issue in Brown,12 8 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina
did address the issue in 1988.129 In Gunn v. Whichard,1 30 the court
5000NC(04)(Rev. 8-90) at 3.
126. See Stanley v. Cobb, 624 F. Supp. 536, 537 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Samply v.
Integrity Ins. Co., 476 So. 2d 79, 80 (Ala. 1985); Pareti v. Sentry Indem. Co., 536
So. 2d 417, 419 (La. 1988).
127. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (1983 & Supp. 1988) (stating that
any insurer providing primary liability insurance on an underinsured highway ve-
hicle, upon payment of all of its applicable limits of liability, may be released
from further liability or obligation to participate in the defense of such
proceedings).
128. See Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 326 N.C. 387, 390 S.E.2d
150 (1990).
129. See Gunn v. Whichard, 707 F. Supp. 196 (E.D.N.C. 1988)(Gunn in-
volved an automobile accident in 1987. Plaintiff Gunn alleged that defendant
Whichard negligently operated his automobile causing Gunn personal injuries.
Plaintiff further alleged the liability of Bobby Whichard under the family purpose
doctrine. Defendant's liability carrier, New Hampshire Insurance Company, "ten-
dered its limits in partial satisfaction of plaintiff's claim and in full satisfaction of
all claims against New Hampshire." Id. at 197. New Hampshire Insurance Com-
pany applied to the court for an order discharging it from further liability or obli-
gation to defend pursuant to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4). Plaintiff's under-
insured carrier objected to New Hampshire Insurance Company's motion to
withdraw.).
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stated that "the underinsured motorist statute allows the primary
liability carrier to.pay its limits and obtain a release of its obliga-
tion under the policy to defend and indemnify.' 131 Arguably, Gunn
provides the necessary guidance for an interpretation of the stat-
ute. But this case is merely a federal court's interpretation of how
the North Carolina courts would address the issue. Brown will in-
evitably arise in litigation regarding a primary carrier's attempt to
be relieved of its duty to continue to provide a defense. 132 Only
time will tell what effect Brown will have on N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-
279.21(b)(4).
CONCLUSION
Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. is but another in a grow-
ing number of North Carolina cases which have continued to ex-
pand the benefits of insurance policies. Brown moves North Caro-
lina farther away from the strict construction of the common law
principles of the freedom to contract. 133 The supreme court's deci-
sion in Brown will prevent an insurance company from unilaterally
tendering policy limits to avoid the expenses of future litigation.
As one court has stated, "A most significant protection afforded by
the policy -that of defense -is rendered a near nullity if the duty
to defend terminated upon unilateral tender of the policy lim-
its." '134 The Supreme Court of North Carolina's ruling in Brown all
but guarantees that such a situation will not occur to the citizens
of North Carolina.
George H. Pender
130. 707 F. Supp. 196 (E.D.N.C. 1988).
131. Id. at- 200.
132. At least one North Carolina superior court judge has ruled that Brown
overrides N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4). Judge J. Milton Read, Jr., Superior
Court Judge of North Carolina, District 14, ruled that the language of Progressive
Insurance Company's policy placed no restrictions on the payment of defense
costs and did not provide for a withdrawal of the defense obligation by a primary
carrier upon tendering its policy limits. Judge Read ruled that the primary carrier
must defend its insured regardless of any language in the statute. See Hocutt v.
Winborne, No. 89-CVS-01232 (Aug. 21, 1990).
133. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 303 N.C. 387, 390-99, 279
S.E.2d 769, 771-75 (1981).
134. Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 326 N.C. 387, 396-97, 390
S.E.2d 150, 155 (quoting Simmons v. Jeffords, 260 F. Supp. 641, 642 (E.D. Pa.
1966)).
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